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Abstract 
We study the demand for household water connections in urban Morocco, and the effect of such 
connections on household welfare. In the northern city of Tangiers, among homeowners without a private 
connection to the city’s water grid, a random subset was offered a simplified procedure to purchase a 
household connection on credit (at a zero percent interest rate). Take-up was high, at 69%. Because all 
households in our sample had access to the water grid through free public taps (often located fairly close 
to their homes), household connections did not lead to any improvement in the quality of the water 
households consumed; and despite significant increase in the quantity of water consumed, we find no 
change in the incidence of waterborne illnesses. Nevertheless, we find that households are willing to pay a 
substantial amount of money to have a private tap at home. Being connected generates important time 
gains, which are used for leisure and social activities, rather than productive activities. Because water is 
often a source of tension between households, household connections improve social integration and 
reduce conflict. Overall, within 6 months, self-reported well-being improved substantially among 
households in the treatment group, despite the financial cost of the connection. Our results suggest that 
facilitating access to credit for households to finance lump sum quality-of-life investments can 
significantly increase welfare, even if those investments do not result in income or health gains. 
2Florencia Devoto, Paris School of Economics and J-PAL: fdevoto@povertyactionlab.org; Esther Duflo, MIT and 
NBER: eduflo@mit.edu; Pascaline Dupas, UCLA and NBER: pdupas@econ.ucla.edu; William Pariente, UC 
Louvain: william.pariente@uclouvain.be; Vincent Pons, MIT: vpons@mit.edu. 
 
1. Introduction  
Worldwide, 1.1 billion people have no access to any type of improved drinking source of water 
within 1 kilometer. Furthermore, only about 42 per cent of the people with access to water have a 
household connection or yard tap (WHO/UNICEF, 2005). As a result, households in developing 
countries spend considerable amount of time fetching water. For example, Kremer et al. (2010) 
estimate that a rural household in Western Kenya does around seven water-fetching trips per day, 
with each trip requiring a 20-minute walk on average. In urban Morocco, the setting of this 
study, households that rely on public taps spend more than seven hours a week collecting water, 
despite the higher density of water taps. The time-burden of water collection does not typically 
spare anyone in the household, but in many countries it is borne primarily by women and girls. 
This burden generates considerable stress and tension. For example, in Morocco, 66% of 
households without a water connection report that water is a major source of concern; 16% have 
had a water-related conflict within the family; and 12% have had water-related conflict with their 
neighbors.   
The prime objective of connecting poor households to the drinking water network is usually to 
improve their physical health. Yet, over and beyond its direct effect on physical health, improved 
water access could have important effects on household well-being. By reducing the time burden 
of water collection, it not only frees up time that could be spent on additional leisure or 
production, it also removes an important source of stress and tension. On the other hand, if 
women face restricted mobility besides their daily trips to the public water source, a home water 
connection could cut off an important source of opportunities to socialize, and possibly reduce 
their well-being.   
The first order effects of access to clean water on health, even in cities, have been amply 
demonstrated (Merrick, 1985; Galiani, Gertler and Schardrogsky, 2005; and Gamper-Rabindran, 
Khan and Timmins, 2010). Given these first-order effects, it is difficult, in most settings, to 
separate the effects of clean water due to the reduced burden of water collection from the effects 
due to health. This paper uses a randomized design to study the non-health effects of easier 
access to in-home water connections on poor urban households in Morocco. Because households 
in our sample already had access to clean water from a public tap, household connections did not 
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lead to improvements in water quality, allowing us to identify the specific effect of a reduced 
water-collection burden on time use, social integration, and mental well-being. We find 
considerable improvement in all these dimensions, without any change in the incidence of 
waterborne diseases (despite an apparent increase in the quantity of water consumed). This 
suggests that the time and resources spent on water collection substantially reduce welfare of 
poor households, a finding consistent with their high willingness to pay for a household 
connection.  
We worked in collaboration with Amendis, the local affiliate of Veolia Environnement, an 
international private utility company, which operates the electrical and wastewater collection 
networks as well as the drinking water distribution in Tangiers, Morocco. In 2007, Amendis 
launched a social program to increase household direct access to piped water. As of the end of 
2007, approximately 845 low-income households living in “on-the-grid neighborhoods” of 
Tangiers (i.e. in principle easily connectable) did not have a household water connection because 
they could not afford the connection fee. Before getting a connection, all these households had 
free access to public taps installed in their neighborhood, and they had access to sanitation at 
their house. The Amendis program provided an interest-free loan to cover the cost of the water 
connection (which was not subsidized, on average). The loan was to be repaid in regular 
installments with the water bill over three to seven years. We implemented an encouragement 
design at the start of the program: we conducted a door-to-door awareness and facilitation 
campaign in early 2008 among 434 households, randomly chosen from the 845 that were eligible 
for a connection on credit. Those households received information about the credit offer as well 
as help with the administrative procedures needed to apply for the credit and the water 
connection: specifically, all the necessary paperwork was photographed in their house, and 
brought to the municipal office for bulk approval. The remaining households (the comparison 
group) were eligible to apply for a connection on credit if they wanted to (10% of them did), but 
they received neither individualized information nor procedural assistance. 
The information and facilitation drive was very successful: by August 2008 (6 months after the 
start of the information campaign), 69% of households in the treatment group had purchased a 
connection (against 10% in the control group), and as a result their average monthly water bill 
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doubled, from 78 to 147 Moroccan dirhams (MAD), or US$11 to $21 a month.3,4
Given the important change in well-being we observe among households in the treatment group, 
it is quite striking that the simple “nudge” of providing information and facilitating 
administrative procedures had such a large effect on the take-up of the credit offer from 
Amendis. This could be due either to a lack of information (the credit program was not discussed 
in the media nor discussed at town hall meetings), or to the fact that households on their own 
were not able to surmount the quite formidable administrative barriers imposed by the program. 
A natural question is thus whether the experience of households in the treatment group 
encouraged their neighbors or social contacts to also invest in a household connection. By 
August 2009 (18 months after the awareness campaign had taken place among treatment 
households), the fraction of control households that had applied for a connection had risen to 
27% (from 10% a year earlier). To test whether this rise can be attributed to social diffusion 
 The quality of 
water was unchanged since public taps are also maintained by Amendis and the water flowing 
into public or private taps comes from the same source. There was, however, a large increase in 
the quantity of water consumed, which some have argued could be as important for health as 
water quality (Esrey et al., 1991). Despite this change in water quantity, we find no change in the 
incidence of waterborne diseases, such as child diarrhea. This confirms the meta-analysis of 
Fewtrel and Colford (2004), arguing that water quantity may not, after all, matter for child 
health.  
In contrast, the connection generated important time gains. These time gains did not lead to 
increases in labor market participation, income, or schooling attainment. Rather, the spared time 
was used for leisure and socializing. The private connection reduced the risk of conflict or ill-
feelings between neighbors. Overall, despite the financial cost, we observe that households’ 
reported well-being improves substantially when they get connected to the water system. These 
results echo those of Cattaneo et al. (2009), showing that a program in Mexico replacing dirt 
floors with cement floors significantly improved adult welfare, as measured by increased 
satisfaction with their housing and quality of life. However, Cattaneo et al. (2009) find that 
cement floors also improve child health, and they hypothesize that that may be a source of the 
increase in happiness.   
3 The exchange rate at the time of the study was approximately 7 MAD to US$1. 
4 The cost at baseline was non-zero because some households were purchasing water from their neighbors. 
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effects, we exploit the random variation in the density of households sampled for the 
encouragement treatment. Among control households that had at least one other study household 
within 20 meters of their house, holding the number of study households within that radius 
constant, we find that those who had at least one treatment household within 20 meters were 18 
percentage points more likely to have bought a water connection by August 2009 than those who 
did not have any treatment households within 20 meters. This difference is significant at the 5% 
level, and suggests important social diffusion effects. 
Overall, our results suggest that, at least in the Moroccan context, households have a relatively 
large willingness to pay for the convenience of a water connection at home. This is particularly 
interesting in light of recent evidence from randomized experiments in Zambia (Ashraf et al, 
2010) and Kenya (Kremer et al, 2009, 2010) suggesting that the willingness to pay for water 
quality (in terms of money spent on chlorine or extra time spent collecting water) is relatively 
low. In contrast, households seem to be willing to pay a lot for quantity and ease of access.  
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental estimates of the effect of providing 
households with the option to connect to the piped water system in a setting where public taps 
with good water quality exist, in contrast with only providing public taps, arguably a cheaper 
way to ensure everyone has access to safe drinking water. Improving access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation is one of the Millennium Development Goals, and accordingly, many 
initiatives in the developing world, such as the “National Initiative for Human Development” in 
Morocco, are planning or are in the process of increasing access to safe drinking water by 
helping poor households get connected to piped water. Our results suggest that such initiatives, 
while they may not improve child health, can have substantial welfare effects at relatively low 
marginal public cost, since households are willing to pay for the extra cost of the connection to 
the grid.  Our findings also suggest that access to credit, rather than costs, may be a significant 
barrier to improvement in household infrastructure. Overall, our results suggest that access to 
credit can enable households to invest in lump-sum quality-of-life investments that can 
significantly improve welfare, even if they do not result in income gain.5
5 This finding is consistent with that of Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2010), who find that, in India, 
households use microcredit loans to purchase assets for their homes more often than to start a new business. 
 Finally, the contrast 
between the willingness to pay the water bills and the large increase in life satisfaction for 
households who got a connection on the one hand, and the important effects on take-up of a 
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campaign that simply reduced informational and administrative barriers on the other hand, is 
quite striking. It underscores the power of the status quo and the potentially high returns of 
designing programs with simplicity and ease of access in mind, even when they are expected to 
have high benefits.  
 
2. Research Design 
2.1.  Amendis’s BSI program 
Amendis is a public-private partnership (a wholly owned subsidiary of Veolia Environnement) 
responsible for the management and operation of public services such as potable water, 
sanitation and electricity distribution networks in the city of Tangiers. 
One of Amendis’s mandates is to increase access of low-income households to basic 
infrastructure. As such, Amendis created a program called “Social Home Connections” (in 
French, “Branchements Sociaux Individuels” or BSI), which allows low-income households to 
buy a connection to the water and sanitation network at full cost, but on credit. The price of a 
connection is a function of the works required to install a pipe from the network to the home 
entrance. Households in the inner city face one of three prices, depending on their distance from 
the grid: the zone 1 price is 3,790 MAD (around US$540), the zone 2 price is 6630 MAD ($940) 
and the zone 3 price is 9,370 MAD ($1,340). All three price categories represent relatively 
important lump sums that many households without access to formal credit can probably not pay 
upfront. The BSI program offered interest-free credit to households in Tangiers’ inner city 
interested in getting a connection. Households have to repay the credit over a period of 3, 5 or 7 
years (depending on the price they faced for the connection) at a monthly rate of 105 MAD or 
$15.  
2.2. Sampling Frame 
Using detailed maps of the city of Tangiers, and merging them with information on existing 
water connections registered in the Amendis database, we first identified 4,600 “plots” that did 
not seem connected to the city water system but that fell within the three zones that Amendis had 
delineated for the BSI program. A team of surveyors we hired inspected these plots and carried 
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out a quick survey to estimate their eligibility for the program. Eligibility required that (1) the 
plot was indeed not already connected to a water network (12% of plots did not meet this criteria, 
due to flaws in the Amendis database); (2) the plot was used for residential purposes (25% plots 
were excluded because they were empty, and 14% were excluded because they were used for 
commercial purposes); (3) the plot hosted the main residence of at least one owner or non-paying 
family occupant (20% of plots were excluded because they were occupied by tenants).  
Our final sample includes 845 households residing on 732 plots. These plots host relatively small 
houses, with a surface below 100 square meters for 96% of the houses. Most plots were inhabited 
by only one household (79% of plots), but 15% included two households, and 6% of plots 
included three or more households. Close to 60% of households relied on the public tap as their 
main source of water (Table 1). The rest were getting their water from a neighbor (either directly 
through a hose or by filling containers), in which case they typically shared the water bill with 
them. These “informal” connections are called “piquage” and are illegal, but tolerated. We 
discuss these baseline characteristics in more detail in section 3.3. 
2.3.  Experimental Design 
The experiment relied on an encouragement design. Households in the sample were randomly 
assigned to a “treatment” and a “control” group. The “treatment” consisted of an information and 
marketing campaign about the BSI program, along with assistance in preparing the application. 
The three main hurdles in the application process were the following: obtaining an authorization 
from the local authorities, providing photocopies of important identification documents, and 
making a down payment at the branch office. We simplified these procedures radically for 
households in the treatment group, by obtaining pre-approval from the authorities in bulk, 
making digital copies of their identification document at home (with cameras), and bringing a 
branch officer to their home to collect the payment. Thus, control households could have 
obtained a connection (some did), but they would have to be aware of the new program and 
manage all the paperwork, while treatment households were individually informed and helped.  
Since part of the strategy relied on differential access to information, in order to avoid assigning 
immediate neighbors to different groups, the assignment of households to the treatment and 
control groups was done after clustering by location. But we also wanted to be able to test for the 
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presence of “post-connection” spillovers, e.g. to test whether non-connected households who 
interact with newly connected households are more likely to apply for a connection. For this 
reason, the randomization was done at an intermediate cluster level: neither at the household 
level, nor at the water source level, but at what we call the “block level”. 
Specifically, the 732 plots in the sample were grouped into blocks, or "clusters", as follows: two 
adjacent plots, or two plots facing each other on the street or up to one house apart, were 
considered part of the same cluster. In total, this method generated 626 clusters. These clusters 
were then randomly assigned (by the research team) to one of the two groups:  the treatment 
group (315 clusters, including 372 plots and 434 households) and the control group (311 clusters, 
including 360 plots and 411 households). These clusters are sufficiently close to each other that 
the information can probably flow from one cluster to the next. In section 6.2 below, we study 
the diffusion of the information on the water connection to geographic neighbors who were not 
directly targeted by the intervention.  
The random allocation of clusters between treatment and control groups was stratified by 
location, water source, the number of children under-five, and number of households within the 
cluster.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Data Collection 
Baseline Household Survey 
A baseline survey was administered in August 2007. It included modules on socioeconomic 
characteristics, work and work-related conditions, health, hygiene practices, water collection, 
storage and treatment practices, social networks, as well as a time use survey for the female head 
and the main child in charge of fetching water. In addition, for a random subsample of 
households, the drinking water was tested for levels of chlorine and the presence of the fecal 
coliform bacteria E coli. This test was performed in a laboratory.   
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Incidence of illnesses: daily follow-up via « illness diaries » 
We carried out an initial month-long survey in December 2007 to estimate the occurrence of 
illnesses among children (diarrhea, fever and vomiting). Data collection of this type requires 
multiple successive visits to the households in order to record an evolution in the occurrence of 
illnesses. We did this as follows. In each household, a first visit was made to distribute an 
“illness diary”. The adult identified as the primary caretaker of the children (the mother in most 
of the cases) was asked to fill out the diary each day, and mark with crosses the occurrence of 
fever, vomiting or diarrhea attacks. The diary had been designed in such a way that even an 
illiterate person would be able to fill it out (a copy of the diary is presented in Appendix A). At 
the end of each of the 4 weeks during which the diary was filled, a surveyor visited the 
households to collect the week’s information and discuss about illness episodes with the female 
head, and, if necessary, complete and correct the diary for that week. Note that, as these 
questions only concern children under the age of 15 years, the illness diaries were used only with 
the 437 households who had declared having children in this age bracket at the time of the initial 
survey. 
Treatment and control households with children under the age of 15 years participated in a 
similar health monitoring scheme in the months of May, August and November 2008. During 
each of these three months, the households filled a new illness diary with the regular help of a 
surveyor. The diaries used were identical to the one used in the initial survey of December 2007 
and the protocol used to monitor their use was the same as that used at baseline.  
Endline Household Survey 
A final survey, similar to the initial survey, was carried out in August 2008, 6 months after the 
information and marketing campaign, and on average, 5 months after the installation of 
household connections for the treatment group. (On average, households received the water 
connection 25 days after completing their BSI application.)  
Among the 845 households who participated in the baseline survey, 793 households (94%) could 
be resurveyed. Attrition was due to the following: around 2% of the baseline household had 
moved house, without leaving behind their new address. 2% refused to answer, despite repeated 
efforts made by the surveyors. The remaining 2% consisted of households who were absent (on 
vacation, Hajj pilgrimage, etc.), or households whose sole-member had passed away.  
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3.2. Data Quality Assurance 
To obtain truthful information from households and to avoid creating any desirability bias in the 
treatment group, the data collection efforts were completely separated from the BSI program 
implementation itself. Namely, the staff that conducted the information campaign and assisted 
households in the treatment group with their connection application was completely different 
from the team of enumerators that administered surveys. We obtained a waiver of informed 
consent from the relevant IRBs in order to not be obligated to disclose the full design of the 
study to the participants until the very end.6
3.3. Verifying Randomization 
 This also enabled us to ensure that the survey team 
did not know about the research team’s relationship with the BSI program.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for households in the sample, separately for the control and 
treatment groups. We also show the difference between the means of the two groups and report 
the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that they cannot be distinguished from each other. 
Overall, households in the two groups are extremely similar. Out of 57 differences shown in 
Table 1, only 3 are significantly different from zero at the 10% level and only 2 are significant at 
the 5% level, as should be expected.  
As mentioned above, at baseline just below 60% of households used the public tap as their main 
source of water. Of those, 22% (15% of the total) lived sufficiently close to the public tap to use 
a hose to fill their water containers at home. The remainder (around 43% of our sample) had to 
take their containers to the public tap. On average, those households who carried containers to 
and back from the public tap lived 112 meters away from the closest public tap.  At baseline, 
they reported filling 52 containers per week. The average time spent fetching water was around 
7.2 hours per week for these households. Water collection trips are common among both men 
and women, but done mostly by adults: while households do more than 7 trips per 3-day period 
to the public tap, less than one of those trips is done by a child under 15. 
 
6 At the end of the study, we fully informed all participants about the study, and asked them for informed consent to 
let us use the data collected from them over the previous two years. Participants in the control group were visited at 
their home in January 2009 and given full information about the BSI program.  
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4. The Demand for Private Taps: Take-up of the BSI credit offer 
Figure 1 presents summary statistics on the take-up of the BSI offer by group (Panel A) and by 
initial water source among those in the treatment group (Panel B). The randomized 
encouragement design had a very large effect on the probability of obtaining a water connection. 
By August 2008, 6 months after the initiation of the encouragement for the treatment group, 298 
(68.7%) of the 434 households in the treatment group had gotten connected to the water system. 
In contrast, only 40 out of 411 households in the control group (9.7%) were connected.   
Among households in the treatment group who did not get connected to the water system, the 
most commonly cited reasons for refusing the BSI offer were the following: inability to pay, 
especially for households with just one member, who was typically an elderly person; 
inheritance problems (i.e., no clear property rights over the house); and plans to move out.  
We formally estimate the correlates of the demand for a household connection in Appendix 
Table A1. We present the results of a linear probability model regression, estimated on the 
treatment group only. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household bought the 
household connection. We control for geographic variables (longitude and latitude) and cluster 
the standard errors at the block level (the unit of randomization, as described above). Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, the price of the water connection had little effect on demand. Demand 
was actually highest in the highest price group (zone 3), and lowest in the second price group 
(zone 2), although the differences are insignificant. The number of households living on the plot 
also did not affect the demand, even though it typically implied a lower price (since some of the 
fixed construction costs were shared). This suggests that the underlying demand for a connection 
may have been quite high, and access to credit and/or administrative complexity were the 
barriers.   
The other baseline characteristics have the expected sign. Households who relied on the public 
tap at baseline (by contrast to those who got water through a neighbor) were significantly more 
likely to take up the connection, and distance to the public tap significantly increased take-up. 
The number of water fetching trips in the past three days reported at baseline does not explain 
take-up, but the share of those trips done by children significantly increased the likelihood that 
households invested in a connection. Finally, larger households, who presumably have higher 
water needs, as well as richer households, were more likely to take-up the connection. 
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5. Short-run effects of improved water access 
5.1. Empirical Strategy 
We estimate the effect of getting easier access to a household connection on a host of outcomes: 
quality and quantity of water consumed, water-related time and financial costs incurred by the 
household, child health, time use, social integration, and overall well-being. For each series of 
outcomes, we estimate two parameters of interest. First, we are interested in the effect of being 
assigned to the treatment group, examined for each outcome using the following specification: 
 
 where Yi is the outcome of interest for household i, Treati is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
household has received the encouragement and Xi  is a vector of household characteristics. 
Randomized assignment of Treati ensures that , and therefore OLS 
estimates of β1 will be unbiased. We adjust the standard errors for clustering.  
Secondly, we are interested in evaluating the average effect of actually having a household 
connection on each outcome. This is estimated with the following specification:  
 
where Connectedi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is connected to the water grid, 
and is instrumented with Treati as follows :  
 
The estimation of this first stage equation is presented in the first column of Table 2.  
In all tables that follow, we present estimates of equation (1) in Panel A, and estimates of 
equation (2) in Panel B. For brevity we only present results that include controls for household 
characteristics (Xi), but the results remain essentially unchanged when such controls are omitted.7
In addition to estimating the average treatment effects, we also provide evidence of the treatment 
effects estimated separately for households that were truly unconnected at baseline, and 
  
7 The baseline household characteristics included as controls are: number of children under 15, quintile in asset 
distribution, water consumption, and distance to the public tap. 
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households that were indirectly connected through an illegal pipe linked to their neighbor’s tap. 
While households who already had running water through their neighbors had potential 
incentives to purchase a private connection through the BSI program, it is likely that the switch 
from an indirect to a direct connection had a lower impact on their lives than the switch from no 
running water to running water.8
 
 To allow for such heterogeneity in the treatment effects by 
initial water source, we estimate the following equation:  
   (3) 
where Ni is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household’s main source of water at baseline was 
an illegal pipe linked to a neighbor connected to the grid. In this specification, β3 estimates the 
impact of the treatment for those truly without running water at baseline, while the sum of the 
coefficients β3 + γ3 estimates the impact of the treatment for those who already had running water 
at baseline (through their informal connection). 
We present results on a wide array of outcomes.  While we typically estimate impacts on each 
individual outcome through independent regressions, we also follow Kling, Liebman and Katz 
(2007) and construct summary indices that aggregate information over multiple treatment effect 
estimates, for given families of outcomes.  For example, we create a child diarrhea index that 
averages the treatment effects estimated over the three waves of diarrhea data collected. 
Likewise, we create a mental health index that averages the treatment effects estimated over 
three measures of mental well-being.  Specifically, we look at the average treatment effect where 
τ is the mean effect size over K outcomes, based on the treatment effect estimate βk on each 
outcome: 
 
We estimate the standard error of τ using seemingly unrelated regressions, in order to account for 
the covariance in the treatment effects. 
8 Given Amendis’s water pricing scheme (which includes consumption brackets), the average cost per cubic meter 
could potentially go down for households that stopped sharing a meter with their neighbor and instead acquired their 
private connection. The availability of the BSI program also reduced the potential “monopoly” pricing power of 
connected neighbors. Finally, water is often a source of tension between neighbors. Buying one’s private connection 
might have been a way to buy peace with one’s neighbors. 
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5.2. Quality and Quantity of Water Used 
The impact of the BSI offer on the quality and quantity of water used is analyzed in Table 2. We 
find no effect of getting connected to the water system on the main indicator of the quality of 
drinking water, the level of fecal bacteria E coli detected (column 3) even though there is a 15 
percentage points increase in the likelihood that chlorine was detected in the drinking water of  
treatment households (column 5). These results suggest that the quality of water coming from 
public taps is relatively high (though not perfect, since the E coli count is around 10 on average, 
and not zero as recommended), and that there is no further contamination during the transport of 
water carried home, or while the water is stored at home.  
While there is no effect on the quality of drinking water, getting connected seems to lead to a 
substantial increase in the quantity of water available. Households in the treatment group are 20 
percentage points more likely to report having enough water for bathing (the mean in the control 
group is 67%) and 16 percentage points more likely to report having enough water for cleaning. 
The IV estimates suggest that water shortages are completely eliminated for households that get 
connected. Finally, respondents in the treatment group report increasing their frequency of baths 
and showers: the number of times respondents in the treatment group had a bath or shower at 
home during the last 7 days is 11% higher than in the control group (0.30/2.75, column 11). Note 
that, unsurprisingly, all these effects are concentrated among households who did not have 
running water at baseline: the coefficients on the treatment effects for those who had an informal 
connection at baseline (row 3) have the same magnitude but the opposite sign as those of the 
main treatment effects (row 1), which implies that the total treatment effects for those 
households already connected was essentially zero.  
5.3. Costs 
Table 3 estimates the impact of the BSI offer on the time and financial costs experienced by 
households. Overall, we find that household connections generate a substantial time gain for 
their beneficiaries, but at the same time generate a substantial financial cost since households 
now have to pay for their water as well as repay the BSI credit.  
Columns 1 to 8 of Table 3 show that the connection considerably reduced the number of water 
fetching trips in the treatment group. The time the household spent fetching water in the last 3 
days reduced from 82 minutes on average in the control group, to essentially zero. This effect is 
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entirely concentrated among those who did not have running water to start with – reassuringly, 
the effect for those with an informal connection at baseline is literally zero (the sum of the 
coefficients in row 1 and row 3 is close to zero for all these time outcomes). 
The finding that trips to the public tap went down to zero for those initially relying on it is more 
interesting than it seems. Water at public taps is free, while households have to pay for the water 
that is piped directly to their home. Therefore one of the concerns at the time the BSI program 
was designed was that people would keep using the public tap and limit their private tap usage, 
in order to limit the size of their water bill. We find little supporting evidence for this. 
The spared time comes at a cost. First, households had to pay a relatively large fixed cost to get 
connected (column 9 and 10). Second, once connected, households have to pay both their 
monthly water bill and their monthly installment. Overall, the IV estimates suggest that the 
average monthly water costs almost doubled for those who bought a connection, from 78 to 
around 147 MAD, a jump from US $11 to $21 (Table 3, columns 11-12). This increase 
corresponds to 2% of reported total household expenditures, and to 13% of declared labor 
income for the household. (Labor income is likely to be underreported in our sample, however.)  
5.4. Health 
The major result arising from the analysis of our health data is the absence of any systematic 
positive effect of the program on health of either children or adults. The data on the incidence of 
water-related illnesses (diarrhea, vomiting, and fever) collected through detailed illness diaries 
show no significant pattern. We present the results for diarrhea among children aged five or 
younger in Table 4. None of the coefficients are significant, and their sign changes from one 
wave of data to the next, suggesting no consistent pattern (Table 4). Overall, the point estimate 
for the average effect across all waves is close to zero, and we can reject at the 5% level a 
reduction of 16 percentage points (about half) in diarrhea incidence (column 10). The addition of 
various control variables does not change the results. The effects on diarrhea among older 
children, or on fever and vomiting, are similar (data not shown).  
We collected data on two other water-related illnesses (skin and eye infections among adults and 
children, and digestive problems for adults), but also find no effect of the treatment on any of 
these, for any age group. We also do not find any effect when we look at the number of medical 
visits reported at endline (data not shown).  
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The lack of effects on health is probably due to the fact that the households in our sample already 
had access to relatively good quality water as well as good access to sanitation. Most households 
reported using the Amendis sanitation system to discharge used water and 95% reported having a 
toilet at home. Nevertheless, positive effects could have been expected from the improvement in 
quantity and the corresponding increase in the washing frequency of households’ members 
(Esrey et al., 1991). The fact that we find no health effects despite the effect on quantity suggest 
that water quantity, alone, plays at best a small role in health, at least in the context studied (an 
urban area where households still had relatively easy access to water from a nearby public tap).  
5.5. Time Use 
As shown earlier, the connection generated large time gains for households who no longer 
needed to spend time fetching water.  Five months after they got connected, these time gains 
were still very salient for households. Table 5 presents estimates of respondents’ self-perception 
of time availability. When asked to compare their current situation with that a year before, 
respondents in the treatment group reported significantly more gains in time for daily activities 
such as housework and watching television than the control group (column 1 to 4). Respondents 
in the treatment group also reported having gained comparatively more time to engage in social 
activities, such as visiting or receiving the visits of family or friends (columns 5 to 12).  
Table 6 presents estimates of the respondents’ actual use of time. The effects are positive but not 
always significant. When we create an index of time spent on leisurely activities, using detailed 
time use data collected at endline, we find a positive and significant effect (columns 9 and 10). 
Somewhat surprisingly, the point estimate of the effect is larger for those illegally connected at 
baseline, but the difference is not statistically significant.  
Table 7 presents results on two other time categories: labor market participation and schooling 
participation (for children). Data on labor market participation comes from the question: “Did 
this person engage in an income generating activity in the past 30 days?”, which was asked at 
endline to the main respondent (typically the female head of the household) about each 
household member. If the answer was yes, we then asked the income gained over the past 30 
days. The data on school participation presented in columns 11-14 also comes from the endline: 
we know the share of children aged between 5 and 15 who completed the 2007/2008 school year 
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(the endline was administered in the summer, between two academic years). We also collected 
detailed school absenteeism data through the use of diaries (similar to the health diaries). 
Overall, the results are clear: the time gained with the water connection had no impact on 
productive activities. We find no increase in the probability that either male or female heads in 
treatment households participate in the labor market. As a result, the program had no effect on 
income (although our income data is extremely noisy and the standard errors are extremely large, 
even with trimming). While it is possible that the impact of time gains on productive activities 
might take more than 5 months to be effective and thus was not captured in our endline survey, 
we also cannot rule out the possibility that our labor market participation and income data suffer 
from under-reporting biases. While there is no reason to believe that the under-reporting bias 
would be correlated with the water connection itself, it has been shown that under-reporting of 
income increases as income goes up. 
The analysis of the impacts on educational investments does not show any impact in time spent 
studying either.  First, we find no effect on school participation as measured by school 
completion (Table 7, columns 11-12). Second, detailed school absenteeism data collected 
through the use of diaries show no impact on the intensive margin of schooling (data not shown). 
Finally, the time use data collected at endline for children of school age suggests no change in 
time spent doing homework. These results are not surprising since children were rarely involved 
in water fetching at baseline (only 1 trip every two weeks on average, as shown in Table 1), and 
since we find no health gains. 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that households used the time saved for leisure only. 
What willingness-to-pay for leisure does that imply, and how does that compare with the local 
hourly wage? Assuming households in our sample discount the future at a reasonable rate, the 
estimates in Table 3 suggest that the water connection cost households around 12 MAD per hour 
saved. In comparison, the minimum wage for employees in Morocco is 9.6 MAD per hour. This 
is likely an upper bound on the average wage in our sample, since the great majority of 
individuals in our sample were either casual workers or unemployed. The fact that our estimated 
willingness-to-pay for leisure is somewhat higher than the hourly wage suggests that the benefits 
of the water connection likely went beyond the time saved. We know that there were no health 
benefits, however. What other benefits could the water connection have brought? In the next 
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sections we study the impact of the connection on social integration and well-being. Consistent 
with the relatively high implied willingness-to-pay, we find positive impacts on these outcomes.    
5.6. Social Integration 
While getting a household connection might have reduced the opportunities to socialize while 
fetching water, the overall impact of the treatment on social integration seems to have been 
positive.  Table 8 presents results on various measures of the strength of social ties. The first two 
columns suggest that the treatment increased the likelihood that households belong to a social 
group. While overall participation in social groups is very rare (only 2% of the control group 
report participating), it is twice as high in the treatment group. Interestingly, this effect is entirely 
driven by an increase in the likelihood that households belong to a rotating savings and credit 
association (ROSCA). This may be due to the fact that households get help from the ROSCA 
structure to pay the installments, or that having to pay their bill regularly generates a habit of 
regular contributions to a fund.   
In addition, gaining access to a private water connection seems to ease the tensions that surround 
access to water. Tensions arise when people compete for access to a public tap, or share a private 
tap and need to divide water bills among relatives or neighbors. Even within the household, both 
the allocation of the task of fetching water and the allocation of the water at hand among possible 
uses can be a source of tension. And indeed, our data suggests that water is a common source of 
conflict: at endline, 16% of control households stated that they were in conflict or disagreement 
with family members on water-related problems (column 3), and 12% were in disagreement with 
neighbors on such issues (column 9). These sources of tensions were almost completely 
eliminated as a result of the program, as shown in columns 3-4 and 9-10 of Table 8. The ITT 
estimates show a 69% reduction in the proportion of households in conflict or disagreement with 
family members and neighbors on water-related problems, and the IV estimates suggest a 
complete elimination of such conflicts for those who got a connection. Note that treatment 
households are not less likely to report conflicts with respect to matters unrelated to the treatment 
(property or heritage issues, in columns 5-9 and 11-12), which suggests that it is indeed access to 
water that reduces water-related conflict. 
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5.7. Mental Well-Being 
Overall, households in the treatment group relative to the control group were much less likely to 
report feeling unhappy about their water situation. Table 9 presents estimates of the effects on 
several measures of satisfaction. While 66% of control households mentioned water when 
prompted to list their 5 major sources of concerns, only 28% of treatment households did so 
(column 1). This went down to zero among households that did get connected, as shown by the 
IV estimate in Panel B. Similarly, the proportion of households that mention that their house is 
cleaner than it was at the same time a year earlier is nearly three times greater (from an average 
of 13% of households in the control group to 13+21=34% in the treatment group, columns 3 and 
4). Again, these reported levels are not driven by social-desirability bias: when asked whether the 
water they have access to now tastes good, treatment households are not more likely to say yes 
than treatment in the control group. This should be expected since all households have access to 
the same water – the only difference between them is how far that water is from them.  
In addition to this higher level of satisfaction with water-related issues, Table 9 also shows that 
the BSI program, more generally, improved households’ perceived quality of life. While only 
23% of respondents in the control group report that the life of their household has improved 
compared to a year ago, this rises by 21 percentage points (almost a 100% increase) in the 
treatment group (columns 7 and 8). Likewise, respondents in the treatment group are 28 
percentage points more likely to report that their own life has improved (columns 9 and 10). 
When asked to score their satisfaction level with their life on a scale from 0 to 10, respondents in 
the treatment group were 6 percentage points more likely to give a score of 5 or above, off a 69% 
base in the control group. We also asked respondents how often they felt sad, worried, etc. over 
the past 7 days. We see a positive impact on mental health when we estimate the impact on a 
summary index composed of all three measures, but the effect is not significant (columns 13 and 
14).   
 
6. Revealed Preferences: Long-run Demand for Household Connection 
The survey data analyzed so far suggests important leisure and subjective well-being gains for 
households in the treatment group.  These gains came at a substantial financial cost to the 
households. Were they happier despite having to pay, or did they start to default on their loans 
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and water payments? In this section, we use revealed preferences to test for the welfare impact of 
the BSI credit offer for participating households. We perform two sets of analyses.  
First, we look at BSI repayment rates among households in the treatment group, two years after 
they took on the BSI credit. Assuming that default on the loan has no cost other than 
disconnection from the water grid (which is a reasonable assumption since there are no credit 
bureaus in Morocco, and Amendis does not have the apparatus to take defaulters to court), 
households for whom the household connection is welfare-decreasing should default on their 
loan. 
Second, we look at the long-run take-up of the BSI offer among households in the control group. 
Recall that the BSI credit was available to control households throughout the study period and 
afterwards, but control households had to apply on their own, without procedural assistance from 
the research team. Given the relatively high procedural costs, the take-up rate among control 
households was very low in the first 6 months (at only 10%). Over time, however, control 
households could have observed or learned about the returns to taking up the connection from 
their counterparts in the treatment group. If the returns are high enough, control households 
should have been willing to pay the upfront procedural costs.  
6.1. BSI Credit Repayment Rates in the Treatment Group 
We obtained historical data on BSI loan repayment as well as water bill payments from Amendis 
in June 2010, more than two years after households in the treatment group had been encouraged 
to apply for a BSI connection. 
BSI loan repayment rates were quite high, with 44% of treated households having repaid all their 
installments to date, and 28% of households owing less than 20% of their total due. Only 5% 
were delinquent on more than 50% of the total due to date, and none of the households had been 
disconnected from the grid, suggesting that none had completely defaulted yet as of June 2010. 
In addition, the water consumption data shows no downwards trend in usage, which suggests that 
households did not revert to using the public tap over time. 
6.2. Spillover effects: Adoption of Piped Water by Control Households 
Given the large positive impacts we observe on the well-being of households in the treatment 
group, a natural question is whether the experience of these households encouraged their 
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neighbors or social contacts to also invest in a home water connection. By August 2009 (18 
months after the awareness campaign had taken place among treatment households), the fraction 
of control households that had applied for a connection had risen to 27% (from 10% a year 
earlier), despite the fact that they did not benefit from personalized assistance with their 
application. They could have learned from their neighbors about the benefit of being connected. 
To test whether the rise in connection rates among the control group over time can be attributed 
to social diffusion effects, we exploit the random variation in the density of households sampled 
for the treatment. 9
9 All households in the control group received information about the credit program in January 2009 (as part of the 
“debriefing” session we held with all study participants as per the IRB requirements), including information on the 
various procedures required to apply for it. While the research team had obtained pre-approval from the local 
authorities for all households in the control group to be allowed to apply for the credit program, a number of red tape 
steps remained for households to perform on their own, including two visits to the local Amendis agency and one 
visit to the Amendis headquarters. 
 
  
Specifically, using GIS coordinates, we compute, for each control household, the number of 
sampled households that live within a given radius, and the number and share of them who were 
sampled for the treatment. We then regress whether a control household bought a connection on 
these measures of “exposure” to treated neighbors. We control for the total number of neighbors 
sampled for the study within each radius, since that is not randomly assigned. This strategy 
(employed by Kremer and Miguel (2007) and Dupas (2010)) provides clean identification for 
social diffusion effects, which usually present difficult issues (Manski, 1993).   
The results are presented in Table 10. They suggest important diffusion effects. Among control 
households that had at least one other study household within 20 meters of their house, holding 
the number of study households within that radius constant, we find that those who had at least 
one treatment household within 20 meters were 18 percentage points more likely to have bought 
a water connection by August 2009 than those who did not have any treatment households within 
20 meters (column 3). This corresponds to a more than 100% increase, compared to the mean 
connection rate of 15% among those with no neighbor assigned to the treatment.  
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7. Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of granting households in urban Morocco the option to purchase a 
private connection to the water system on credit. We find that the demand for a household 
connection is high, with 68% of households taking on a 3-, 5- or 7-year loan to get connected 
when they are targeted by a door-to-door information campaign and helped with the necessary 
paperwork. Only 10% of the households who were eligible for the same offer but did not receive 
tailored information and procedural assistance connected over the same period.  
 
After six months, this investment turned out to have significant private returns. While it freed up 
a lot of time for household members, it did not generate increases in labor market participation 
and income, but it led to important improvements in quality of life and welfare. In particular, it 
increased reported happiness and social integration. While the private returns are high, the public 
health impacts seem low, if not nonexistent. In the study context, household connections do not 
reduce the incidence of waterborne diseases compared to the existing system of public taps. This 
lack of health effect suggests that investing public funding in expanding access to household 
connections might not be justified from a public finance standpoint. However, the high private 
returns and high observed willingness to pay suggests that relaxing credit constraints for poor 
households and making credit access straightforward and transparent might be sufficient to 
generate important private investments in water connections. 
 
These findings thus have some relevance for the debate on whether investment in water 
infrastructure should focus on providing safe shared drinking water sources, or whether 
providing individual access is important. Most experts conclude that it is not cost effective to 
individually connect all households to water.10
10 However, some, like the NGO Gram Vikas in India, have the opposite point of view, and take it that it is essential 
for every household to have its own tap as well as sanitation facilities.  
 Previous studies (Ashraf et al., 2010; Kremer et 
al., 2010) have found very low willingness to pay for water purity, either in money (purchase of 
chlorine) or time (walking to the improved source). Part of the public investments in improving 
drinking water quality may be thus be lost if households are left to walk the “last mile”, because 
they may simply not walk it (in our setting, all the public sources of water are clean, but in the 
Kremer et al., 2010 study, where only some sources were improved, few households appeared to 
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switch source for most of their water needs). Our results, which reveal an important willingness 
to pay for access to water, suggest that offering households the option to pay all or part of the 
marginal cost to be individually connected with easy, affordable credit, may actually be a way to 
increase the rate of returns to the public investment.  
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Figure 1. First Stage: Impact of the Encouragement Design
Notes: Data on connection status collected in August 2008. No household had a connection to the piped water 
system at baseline (August 2007). The encouragement intervention took place between February and April 
2008. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
P-value 
Treatment = 
Control
Obs. 
Household composition Mean Sd Mean Sd
Household size 4.55 2.54 4.73 2.48 0.294 841
Number of members 15 or older 3.31 2.00 3.47 1.99 0.240 838
Number of female members 15 or older 1.66 1.14 1.65 1.13 0.936 837
Number of members under 15 1.24 1.56 1.25 1.40 0.961 836
Number of female members under 15 0.59 0.92 0.64 0.87 0.505 836
Number of children under 5 0.40 0.73 0.42 0.70 0.704 833
Is this an extended family? 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.995 834
Head of the household
Head is male 0.74 0.44 0.79 0.41 0.157 833
Head's age 50.90 15.00 49.81 14.24 0.293 801
Head married 0.66 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.274 833
Head has no education 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.484 833
Head has 1 to 6 years of education 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.565 833
Household members involved in economic activities
Number of adults, in past 30 days 1.07 0.97 1.16 0.95 0.222 833
Number of children, in past 30 days 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.156 833
Socio-economic status
Number of rooms in the house 3.20 1.34 3.31 1.46 0.251 838
Income index 4.21 2.52 4.42 2.50 0.256 759
Assets index -0.14 1.96 -0.07 1.97 0.596 842
Hygiene and health
Index of knowledge of causes of diarrhea 1.25 1.09 1.23 1.12 0.784 842
Ranking of own's health 6.58 2.50 6.38 2.33 0.248 806
Expenditures for individual hygiene 67.33 78.03 74.03 95.21 0.297 745
Expenditures for house cleaning 57.28 100.74 74.23 90.53 0.011 838
Number of times respondant bathed in previous 7 days 4.27 3.77 4.30 3.27 0.923 818
Number of times respondant washed hands yesterday 2.84 1.50 2.97 1.60 0.237 837
Index of cleanness of the house (surveyor's observation) 0.67 0.20 0.66 0.19 0.516 623
Social insertion
Participation of the respondent to a group 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.690 837
Total number of activities with others listed 0.38 0.68 0.41 0.68 0.617 845
Total number of friends listed when asked for 5 names 1.73 1.41 1.86 1.47 0.169 845
Has someone to talk to about one's problems 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.46 0.290 831
Satisfaction level with one's life (on a scale from 1 to 10) 8.38 17.28 7.08 12.84 0.214 839
Water and storage
Are you storing water right now? 0.82 0.38 0.85 0.36 0.308 838
In how many containers are you storing water? 3.72 4.33 3.58 3.62 0.618 840
Do you treat the water? 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.21 0.217 706
Presence of chlorine in water sample 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.290 250
Water Source and Collection
Main water source =  public tap, using containers 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.728 839
Main water source =  public tap, using hose 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.457 839
Main water source =  neighbor's tap, using informal pipe 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.817 839
Main water source = neighbor's tap, using hose or containers 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.912 839
Distance to the public tap (in meters, measured by research team) 139 158 134 133 0.638 845
continued next page
Comparison 
Households
Treatment 
Households
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued)
P-value 
Treatment = 
Control
Obs. 
Time spent fetching water over the past 7 days (minutes) 233 420 204 385 0.300 821
Time spent in social activities while fetching water over the past 7 
days (minutes)
8.2 44.1 7.6 37.9 0.845 822
# of Containers filled with water over the past 7 days 34.2 50.2 33.6 49.5 0.876 821
Volume of water consumed over the past 7 days (liters) 334 591 385 816 0.309 821
Payment made to get water over the past 7 days (dirhams) 20.05 70.67 19.79 55.88 0.95 829
Number of times a child (< 15) fetched water in the past 3 days 0.53 2.09 0.48 1.88 0.729 841
Number of times a grown-up (>= 15) fetched water in the past 3 
days
3.68 5.23 3.87 6.06 0.623 841
Number of times a male fetched water in the past 3 days 1.86 3.56 2.35 4.86 0.094 841
Number of times a female fetched water in the past 3 days 2.35 4.91 2.00 4.29 0.271 841
Distance to the public tap (in meters, measured by research team) 106 167 118 127 0.481 346
Time spent fetching water over the past 7 days (minutes) 445 533 421 492 0.675 328
Time spent in social activities while fetching water over the past 7 
days (minutes)
5.6 26.5 7.8 35.5 0.512 329
# of Containers filled with water over the past 7 days 52.6 48.3 51.9 47.1 0.894 328
Volume of water consumed over the past 7 days (liters) 361 336 433 467 0.107 328
Payment made to get water over the past 7 days 4.42 39.06 2.08 10.37 0.458 336
Number of times a child (< 15) fetched water in the past 3 days 0.78 2.30 0.90 2.54 0.654 346
Number of times a grown-up (>= 15) fetched water in the past 3 
days
6.91 6.14 7.42 7.52 0.486 346
Number of times a male fetched water in the past 3 days 3.40 4.22 4.74 6.35 0.021 346
Number of times a female fetched water in the past 3 days 4.29 6.50 3.58 5.77 0.284 346
Notes: Household averages collected during baseline survey (August 2007). 
Comparison 
Households
Treatment 
Households
Households with main source of water = public tap, using containers
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Table 2: Impact on Water Quality and Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment 0.60 0.62 2.80 2.56 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.30 0.25
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (3.00) (3.44) (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.16)* (0.16)
Primary water source at baseline was an 0.02 -2.03 -2.50 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.23 -0.14 -0.27
informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap (0.05) (3.76) (4.23) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.25) (0.29)
Treatment X Informal pipe linked to -0.10 1.11 -0.13 -0.18 -0.16 0.25
 neighbor's tap (0.08) (7.00) (0.14) (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.45)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 793 793 371 371 374 374 792 792 791 791 789 789
Mean in Control Group 0.10 0.10 10.43 10.43 0.43 0.43 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.71 2.75 2.75
Connected 4.36 3.97 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.27 0.31 0.50 0.40
(4.70) (5.30) (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.26)* (0.26)
Primary water source at baseline was an -2.23 -3.01 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.30 0.16 0.26 -0.12 -0.35
informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap (3.82) (5.33) (0.08) (0.12) (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.25) (0.36)
Connected X Informal pipe linked to 1.79 -0.20 -0.27 -0.24 0.54
 neighbor's tap (11.13) (0.22) (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.83)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 371 371 374 374 792 792 791 791 789 789
Notes: Data source: Endline survey conducted in August 2008. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
Columns 3-6: Water quality tests were performed on a random subsample of participating households. 
Household controls include: Number of children under 15 at baseline, quintile in asset distribution, quantity of water consumed the week before baseline, and distance to the public tap.
Water Quantity
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
Water Quality
Number of E Coli 
detected in 
drinking water
Chlorine detected in 
drinking water
HH reports having 
enough water for 
bathing
HH reports having 
enough water for 
cleaningConnected
1st Stage
Number of baths or 
showers taken by 
respondent in the 
past 7 days
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Table 3: Impact on Time and Financial Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment -2.47 -2.88 -0.69 -0.91 -66.56 -79.59 -3.21 -3.97 411.79 443.65 68.60 66.03
(0.32)*** (0.37)*** (0.23)*** (0.29)*** (8.78)*** (10.49)*** (1.69)* (2.06)* (42.55)*** (50.36)*** (17.51)*** (13.65)***
Primary water source at baseline was an -1.29 -2.35 -0.46 -0.97 -30.75 -63.74 -4.13 -6.08 -135.66 -54.98 81.16 74.65
informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap (0.33)*** (0.62)*** (0.17)*** (0.30)*** (8.56)*** (13.05)*** (2.10)** (2.94)** (61.23)** (51.21) (38.37)** (24.18)***
Treatment X Informal pipe linked to 2.07 0.95 64.31 3.80 -157.26 12.69
 neighbor's tap (0.67)*** (0.32)*** (15.60)*** (1.85)** (87.78)* (67.72)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 787 787 455 455 793 793 793 793 793 793 793 793
Mean in Control Group 3.11 3.11 0.86 0.86 81.92 81.92 4.13 4.13 82.51 82.51 78.51 78.51
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
Connected -4.09 -4.63 -1.04 -1.30 -110.81 -127.92 -5.34 -6.39 685.58 713.60 114.20 106.29
(0.53)*** (0.58)*** (0.33)*** (0.41)*** (14.39)*** (16.60)*** (2.78)* (3.27)* (57.32)*** (65.64)*** (28.14)*** (20.86)***
Primary water source at baseline was an -1.41 -2.70 -0.49 -1.15 -34.61 -75.73 -4.32 -6.84 -111.73 -44.42 85.14 66.13
informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap (0.35)*** (0.79)*** (0.18)*** (0.35)*** (9.13)*** (16.22)*** (2.18)** (3.26)** (53.08)** (48.66) (38.58)** (31.59)**
Connected X Informal pipe linked to 3.00 1.35 96.35 5.92 -157.77 44.56
 neighbor's tap (1.21)** (0.47)*** (27.22)*** (2.85)** (134.00) (124.17)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 787 787 455 455 793 793 793 793 793 793 793 793
Notes: See Table 2.
Monthly water 
expenditures 
(in dirhams)
Fixed Water Costs paid 
by Household in past 
year (dirhams)
Number of times a 
child (< 15) 
fetched water in the 
past 3 days
Number of times a 
grown-up(>= 15) 
fetched water in the 
past 3 days
Minutes Spent Fetching 
Water in the past 3 
days
Minutes Spent 
Socializing while 
Fetching Water in the 
past 3 days
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment 0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.011 0.001 -0.014
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.056) (0.066) (0.066)
Treatment X Informal pipe linked to -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.14 0.042 0.050
 neighbor's tap (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.137) (0.134)
Child Controls (age, gender) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for # of Intense Diarrhea days observed in baseline diary Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 473 473 473 458 458 458 1401 1401 1401
Mean in Control Group 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.254 0.254 0.254
Connected 0.08 0.08 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.1 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Connected X Informal pipe linked to 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.09
 neighbor's tap (0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.24) (0.24)
Child Controls (age, gender) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for # of Intense Diarrhea days observed in baseline diary Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 473 473 473 458 458 458 458 458 458
Notes: Data source: Illness Diaries collected at three points in time (May 2008, August 2008 and November 2008).
†  Intense diarrhea defined as follows: at least three loose stools within 24 hours
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household controls as in Table 2. All regressions also include a control for the number of days the diary was properly filled and a dummy for 
"Informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap". 
Table 4. Impact on child health: Data from Illness Diaries (1 month each)
3rd follow-up: November 
2008
Average Weekly Number of days with intense diarrhea†:
Children 0 to 7 years old at baseline
1st follow-up:
May 2008
2nd follow-up:           
August 2008
Average effect over three 
follow-ups
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Table 5: Perceived Time Availability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.02 -0.03
(0.046)** (0.053)** (0.044)*** (0.048)*** (0.043)*** (0.049)** (0.034)** (0.04) (0.041)** (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Treatment X Informal pipe -0.12 -0.21 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.24
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.10) (0.107)** (0.11) (0.09) (0.106)* (0.078)***
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 791 791 785 785 790 790 790 790 790 790 788 788
Mean in Control Group -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06
Connected 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.05
(0.075)** (0.084)*** (0.074)*** (0.077)*** (0.072)*** (0.078)** (0.057)** (0.06) (0.068)** (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Connected X Informal pipe -0.18 -0.34 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.44
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.17) (0.197)* (0.20) (0.17) 0.00 (0.202)* (0.151)***
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 791 791 785 785 790 790 790 790 790 790 788 788
Notes: Clutered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
Answers to the questions were coded as follows: less time: -1; same time: 0; more time: +1.
Household controls as in Table 2. All regressions include a dummy for "Informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap". 
...watch tv? ...visit your family? ...visit friends/ neighbors? 
...receive the visit 
of your family? 
...receive the visit 
of friends/ 
neighbors
Compared to last year, do you have less/as much as/more time to …
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
.. do housework? 
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Table 6: Actual Time Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment 0.051 0.061 0.059 0.072 0.000 0.004 0.070 0.031 0.170 0.158
(0.036) (0.040) (0.035)* (0.039)* (0.038) (0.042) (0.035)** (0.039) (0.047) ** (0.054) **
Treatment X Informal pipe -0.048 -0.060 -0.020 0.192 0.056
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.084) (0.083) (0.095) (0.081)** (0.105)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 790 790 788 788 791 791 789 789 788 788
Mean in Control Group 0.59 0.59 0.43 0.43 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.19 1.33 1.33
Connected 0.086 0.098 0.099 0.115 -0.001 0.006 0.116 0.050 0.281 0.253
(0.059) (0.065) (0.058)* (0.064)* (0.063) (0.067) (0.059)** (0.063) (0.080) ** (0.088) **
Connected X Informal pipe 0.00 -0.090 -0.036 0.371 0.150
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.15) (0.151) (0.175) (0.161)** (0.197)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 790 790 788 788 791 791 789 789 788 788
± Across 8 leisurely activites, average number of 30-min periods for which the respondent recalls performing activity. The 8 activities are: watching TV, 
exercising, being on the phone, going on a walk, praying, visiting other people,  receiving other people at home, or "other leisure" (going to coffee shop, 
beach, etc.).
...do housework at 
least once a day? 
...receive the visit of 
family members or 
friends/neighbors at 
least twice?
Average effect on 8 
leisurely activities 
(timetable data)±
Over the past 7 days, did you…
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. Households controls as in Table 2.  All regressions include a 
dummy for "Informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap". 
...watch tv at least 
once a day? 
...visit family 
members or 
friends/neighbors at 
least twice?
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Table 7: Labor Market and School Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 9.1 34.0 -39.0 -55.8 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)* (0.02) (0.02) (67.5) (74.1) (36.2) (42.6) (0.03) (0.04)
Treatment X Informal pipe -0.04 0.09 0.00 -127.8 83.7 -0.01
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (172.9) (79.2) (0.07)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 793 793 793 793 363 363 769 769 788 788 363 363
Mean in Control Group 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 710.8 710.8 160.1 160.1 0.88 0.88
Connected 0.000 0.010 -0.050 -0.080 -0.030 -0.030 15.0 54.1 -64.6 -89.4 -0.040 -0.030
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)* (0.03) (0.03) (111.2) (118.4) (60.1) (68.5) (0.05) (0.05)
Connected X Informal pipe -0.070 0.150 -0.010 -223.5 139.4 -0.020
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.15) (0.10) (0.06) (308.9) (141.3) (0.11)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 793 793 793 793 363 363 769 769 788 788 363 363
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. Households controls as in Table 2.  All regressions include a 
dummy for "Informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap". 
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
Share of children 5-
15 (if any) who 
completed the 
school year
Income generated 
by Male Head 
in past 30 days
Income generated 
by Female Head 
in past 30 days
Male Head had an 
income generating 
activity 
in past 30 days
Female Head had 
an income 
generating activity 
in past 30 days
A child age 5-15 (if 
any) had an 
income generating 
activity 
in past 30 days
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Table 8: Social Integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01
(0.01)* (0.01)** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.01) (0.01)
Treatment X Informal pipe -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 791 791 792 792 792 792 792 792 789 789 791 791
Mean in Control Group 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.01
Connected 0.04 0.04 -0.18 -0.19 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 0.02 0.02
(0.02)* (0.02)** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.01) (0.02)
Connected X Informal pipe -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 791 791 792 792 792 792 792 792 789 789 791 791
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. Households controls as in Table 2.  All regressions include a dummy for 
"Informal pipe linked to neighbor's tap". 
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
People from 
his/her family on 
property matters
Do you belong to 
a social group or 
association?
The respondent is in conflict or disagreement with:
People from 
his/her family on 
water matters
Neighbors on 
property matters
Neighbors on 
water matters
People from 
his/her family on 
heritage matters
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Table 9: Satisfaction and Well-Being
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A. ITT Estimation
Treatment -0.38 -0.43 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.034 0.022
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03) (0.04)* (0.025) (0.028)
Treatment X Informal pipe 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.057
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.08)*** (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.060)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 792 792 792 792 791 791 792 792 792 792 793 793 788 788
Mean in Control Group 0.66 0.66 0.13 0.13 0.57 0.57 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.60
Connected -0.64 -0.69 0.34 0.32 0.00 -0.01 0.35 0.34 0.46 0.43 0.09 0.12 0.055 0.035
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)* (0.06)* (0.041) (0.044)
Connected X Informal pipe 0.29 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.16 -0.16 0.115
 linked to neighbor's tap (0.14)** (0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.110)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 792 792 792 792 791 791 792 792 792 792 793 793 788 788
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%. Households controls as in Table 2.  All regressions include a dummy for "Informal pipe linked 
to neighbor's tap". 
± Average effect over three measures (over past 7 days, respondent felt, more often than not, sad / worried / satisfied). Coded so that 1 reflects high well-being and 0 reflects low well-being.
Average effect on 
mental well-being±
Respondent 
mentions water as 
major source of 
concern
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimation: "Connected" Instrumented with "Treatment"
Overall, the life of 
the household has 
improved compared 
to a year ago
Home is cleaner 
than a year ago
Water tastes 
good
Overall, the 
respondent's life 
has improved 
compared to a year 
ago
Respondent rates 
life satisfaction 
level ≥ 5 (on 0-10 
scale)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R=20 R=50
At least one household assigned to treatment within radius R 0.176 0.078 0.10 0.05
(0.076)** (0.054) [.15] [.16]
Share of households assigned to treatment within radius R 0.148 0.113 0.08 0.05
(0.082)* (0.067)* [.15] [.16]
# of households assigned to treatment within radius R 0.108 0.017 0.10 0.05
(0.046)** (0.020) [.15] [.16]
Total # of households sampled for study within radius R 0.04 0.055 0.006 0.019 0.022 0.014 1.91 3.94
(0.030) (0.028)* (0.035) (0.010)* (0.010)** (0.015) [1.48] [3.01]
Observations 221 221 221 345 345 345
Mean of Dep. Var. among those with no household 
assigned to treatment within radius R 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
Notes: For each radius choice, sample restricted to households with at least one sampled household within the chosen radius. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dep. Var: Bought BSI Connection
Table 10: Social Diffusion: Adoption of Water Connection by Control Households 
Among those with at least one 
sampled household within Radius 
R=20 meters
Among those with at least one 
sampled household within Radius 
R=50 meters
sample mean 
[std. dev.] 
of indep. var.
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Table A1. Correlates of Home Connection Take-up (among Treatment Group)
Bought a Home 
Connection
Dummy for Zone 2 Price (6640 MAD) -0.091
(0.082)
Dummy for Zone 3 Price (9370 MAD) 0.043
(0.116)
Number of households living on the plot -0.015
(0.028)
Main water source = public tap 0.087
(0.052)*
Log (Distance to the closest public tap) 0.046
(0.027)*
Total number of water fetching trips in the past 3 days 0.001
(0.004)
Share of water fetching trips in the past 3 days done by child (<15 years) 0.184
(0.075)**
Household Size 0.026
(0.010)**
Asset index 0.048
(0.011)***
Number of adults with an income-generating activity 0.041
(0.023)*
Household Head is Male 0.022
(0.056)
Latitude 2.000
(2.085)
Longitude -1.075
(1.250)
Observations 430
R-Squared 0.13
Mean of Dev. Var. 0.687
Notes: Sample restricted to households randomly assigned to the treatment group. Coefficient estimated through 
OLS regression. Omitted price category is Zone 1 (3790 MAD).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the cluster level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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